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Abstract 
The German armaments production during World War II (1939-1945) is a 
highly debatable issue. Many studies point out that it was a success story since the 
overall production increased in spite of the heavy Allied air bombing campaign 
during the period 1943-1945. Others point out that the size of the production could 
not balance the aggregate production of Britain, USA, and the USSR. This study 
points out that by the end of 1941 with the entry of the USSR and the US in the war 
Germany had to plan for two different types of war. One was a land war against the 
USSR and the second was a naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers (Britain 
and the USA). German industry did quite well with the first challenge (with the 
assistance of captured material and industrial power of occupied Europe) but failed 
in the naval-air war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers. 
1. Introduction 
The German armaments production during World War II (1939-1945) is a 
highly debatable issue. The debate is focused on the following issues: 
The first is the volume of the production. Many economists and historians observe a 
high volume of production even under the constraint of allied bombing. Others hold 
the view that the production levels, for the most industrialized European power, were 
quite low and could not match the combined armaments production of Great Britain 
and USSR, let alone the considerable production of the United States.  
The second issue is the wide range of the types of material produced. The argument 
points out that the outcome of the production 
process was not standardized equipment but 
multiple types of weapons, all produced in 
small quantities. This meant an absence of 
economies of scale and of scope.  
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The structure of the article is as follows: The first section is a critical 
overview of the existing literature, noting strengths and limitations of previous 
studies. This helps provide an overview of the size of production and the multiple 
types of weaponry. The second section develops an original perspective by applying 
the best available data about the costs of armaments procurement. Here we follow a 
cost-benefit analysis rationale in order to determine the efficiency (or inefficiency) 
of the production process. The next section provides an analysis of the German 
military doctrines and the available armaments equipment. The nexus between the 
two is crucial in order to determine the success or failure of the German armaments 
industry. The conclusions of the study follow.  
2. German armaments policy: Size of production and types of weaponry 
This section provides an overall presentation and assessment of the studies 
on the size of the German armaments industry during the war. We begin with studies 
in English by English speaking academics or studies by Germans translated into 
English, before looking at German sources. 
2a. Studies in English or English translations 
The first wave of studies is associated with Milward (1965, 1977).2 Milward 
(1965) notes that the war industry was closely related to the Blitzkrieg type of 
warfare of the German army. Germany did not have the manpower resources or the 
raw materials for a prolonged war. The defence industry (and its production) was 
therefore organised in such a way as to supply the armed forces for quick wars. Thus 
during the period September 1939-July 1940 the priority was given to the army. But, 
with the fall of France, priority shifted from land systems to aircraft for the 
Luftwaffe.3 However, between September and December 1940, priority shifted from 
aircraft to submarines in order to beat Britain. The German invasion of the USSR in 
June 1941 saw priorities change to ammunition, guns, tanks and aircrafts; and thus 
submarine production was reduced.  
Throughout the war years Germany enjoyed a complete machine tools 
advantage in its industry when compared with those of other European states and the 
US. To illustrate, in 1938 Germany had 3 795 000 machine tools of various types; 
whereas France had 550 000 and Italy had 207 000 (for 1939). The figures for 1945 
were 5 152 000 to 6 647 000 machine tools for Germany, 800 000 for Britain, 600 
000 for France, 290 000 for Italy, and 1 883 000 for the USA.4 This machine tool 
superiority was not exploited, according to Milward (1965, 1977), as German 
industry did not work for three eight hour shifts, but also as it came under 
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bombardment by the allied air forces. Despite these limitations, Milward notes the 
industry could supply 250 infantry divisions and 40 armour divisions in 1944. In 
comparison to the Allies however, overall German production was lower. Germany 
produced 111 767 aircraft during the 1934-1944 period, whereas Britain produced 
123 819 during the 1934-1945 period, and American production was nearly 300 000 
in 1940-1945. Also US tank production was double that of Germany’s.5 
 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Rifles  1 351 700 1 358 500 1 370 180 2 244 100 2 585 600 
Ammunition 
(in tons) 
865 000 540 000 1 270 000 2 558 000 3 350 000 
Μedium 
tanks 
1  359 2 875 5 595 9 398 12 096 




1 870 2 852 4 542 9 626 25 860 
Table 1: Defence Industry Production 1940-19446 
Mierzejewski (1988) is an essential source and the data on defence 
production for the 1940-1944 period, appear in Table 1. Mierzejewski explains the 
increases in production volumes as associated with higher productivity. The labor 
productivity index increased as follows: 1941-1942=100, 1942-1943=157, 1943-
1944=189. Specifically, for June-July 1944 the index was 234. A second reason is is 
that the raw materials were used more efficiently. Thus between 1941-1944 the ratio 
per weight between raw materials to final product was reduced from 4:1 to 2:1. A 
third reason is associated with administrative reforms. Until 1939 the army, the navy 
and the air-force had different procurement branches, all under the auspices of the 
Wirtschaft Rüstung Bureau (Armaments and Economics Department). In March 
1940 the post  of Minister of Armaments and Ammunition was established. Initially 
given to Fritz Todt, it was given to Albert Speer in February 1942. Speer introduced 
major administrative changes.7 
Ranki (1993) is the first study providing detailed numbers of defence article 
production according to type. To illustrate, the author, points out, that between the 
years 1939-1945, the following types were procured: 31 898 Me-109 fighters; 16 
911 Ju-88 planes; 7 647 FW-190 fighters; 6 247 Me-110 night fighters; 5 678 He-
111 bombers; 4 890 Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers; 2 804 Ju-52 transport planes. The 
study provides aggregate numbers for tank production, self-propelled (S/P) gun 
production, and armour vehicle production during 1940-1944. According to these 
figures the number of tanks produced was 23 181 units, the number of armoured 
vehicles was 14 162 and the number of S/P guns was 5 335 units. The study 
differentiates between different types of tanks such as light Mark-I and Mark-II types 
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(1 168 and 632 respectively) versus the medium Mark-III and heavy Mark-IV types 
(5 672 and 8 168) and the super-heavy Tiger I (1 398 pieces) and Tiger II (379) types 
and the Panther S/P guns (5 814 pieces). According to Ranki (1993) the increased 
armaments production is associated with massive investments in machinery until 
1942. Between the years 1939-1941, the annual machine tools production was 195 
000-200 000 tools. In 1942 it was 162 000 tools, in 1943 it was 140 000 and in 1944 
it was 110 000.8  
Overy (1994, 1995, 1996, 2005)9 is an essential contribution. Overy notes 
that though Hitler had a long term plan for war he did not anticipate a prolonged war 
in 1939, and that nevertheless between September 1939 and December 1941 
investments in the defence industry in fact increased. Total investments during the 
September-December 1939 period were 1 318 million RM (Reichsmarks), 
increasing in 1940 to 5 841.6 million, and 7 599.6 million in 1941.10 These massive 
investments explain the increase in armaments production during subsequent years. 
Overy provides a different picture from Mierzejewski (1988) on productivity. 
According to Overy (1994) the productivity index was as follows: 1939=100, 
1940=87,6; for 1941=75,9; for 1942=99,6; for 1943=131,6 and for 1944=160.11 
Overy notes that the lower productivity of the 1940-1942 period slowed armaments 
production and thus Hitler’s demands could not be reached before 1944. The 
productivity increase during the 1943-1944 period could not compensate for the 
complexity of defence procurement. For example, a Ju-88 bomber needed 4 000 
different types of screws and ball bearings. To simplify complexity, in 1942 the 
designers proposed 18 000 amendments to the plane production. Similarly, the 
designs (types) of trucks decreased from 151 in 1939 to 23 in 1942; and of 
motorcycles from 150 to 26 in the same period.12  
Harvey (1994) highlights structural rigidities and inefficiencies. For 
instance, in 1940, Germany was spending 58 percent more money on defence 
procurement compared to Britain; yet the actual size of the production was smaller. 
Labour force productivity was low. To illustrate, in 1942 only the 1/10 of the labour 
force in tank, artillery, armour vehicles and small arms industries was working 
double shifts. In the aircraft industry only 33 percent worked double shifts. He points 
out that the civil-military relations of the 1939-1945 era were similar to those of the 
1914-1918 era. Thus in the First World War the German industrialists enjoyed a 
“blank cheque” by the state. In the Second World War, initially they had to face a 
state and Nazi Party intervention (Nazi Party, Gestapo, SS) but thereafter the 
Armaments Minister Speer established a very good working relationship with the 
German industry.13  
117 
 
There is some confusion when it comes to the numbers. Overy (1995) 
provides the following aggregate estimates of production for the period 1939-1945: 
Aeroplanes: 117,881 units; Tanks: 63 800 units (including S/P guns); Artillery: 625 
000 guns; and 954 submarines.14 Ellis (1995) notes that between 1939-1945 
Germany produced: 46 857 tanks and S/P guns; 159 144 artillery units; 674 280 
machine-guns; 73 484 mortars; 345 914 trucks; and 189 307 aeroplanes. From those, 
55 727 (29.4 percent) were fighters, 18 235 (9.6 percent) were bombers, 12 539 (6.6 
percent) were ground support, 6 299 (3.3 percent) were reconnaissance, 3 079 (1.6 
percent) were transports, and 11 546 (6.09 percent) were trainers. Turning to naval 
armaments. Ellis points out that Germany procured 17 destroyers and an astonishing 
number of 1 141 submarines during the war.15 According to a different source, 
German production totalled 10 328 000 rifles; 1 257 000 pistols; 1 176 000 machine-
guns; 320 000 artillery pieces; 78 800 mortars; 46 300 tanks and S/P guns; 89 500 
fighter planes; and 954 submarines.16 To add to the confusion of numbers, the study 
of Murray and Millett (2000) provides the following figures for the 1940-1945 
period: 97 810 aeroplanes; 50 800 tanks and S/P guns; 85 000 artillery pieces; 20 
naval ships; and 981 submarines.17  
The first study on the subject was by Hitler’s armaments minister Albert 
Speer (2002). Speer pointed out that the tank production was multiplied by a factor 
of five between 1940-1944 and the gross weight increased by 7.7 times. The index 
of artillery, was increased by 3.3 times, between the years 1941-1944. Τhe aggregate 
ammunition index (combined production for army, navy, air-force) in 1941 was 102 
and by 1944 it was 306. In spite of the increase, ammunition production was lower 
compared to that of 1914-1918. The average monthly production in 1941 of selected 
defence articles was as follows: 133 000 rifles, 7 100 machine guns, and 79 000 
mines. In November 1944 the numbers were as follows: 307 000 rifles, 28 700 
machine guns, and 3 820 000 mines. 18      
The study of Tooze (2006) provides a departure from the previous literature. 
Tooze (2006) points out that when the war erupted the Naval Z plan was abolished 
and the only naval priority was that of submarine production. The priority was given 
to the procurement of ammunition and Ju-88 bombers. Thus, between September 
1939 and June 1940, 70 percent of raw materials was absorbed by the ammunition 
and the aircraft industry. During the period June 1940-June 1941, in preparation for 
the invasion of USSR, priority went to the production of tanks, artillery guns, small 
arms and machine guns. However although in July 1940 ammunition production was 
36 percent of total armaments production, in the summer of 1941 it was just 20 
percent. The reduction of ammunition production was associated with the high stock 
piles of shells which the German army had available from 1940 and the shift allowed 
the procurement of 12 000 aeroplanes in 1941 as opposed 10 826 in 1940. The study 
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points out that the investments in the aircraft industry increased between December 
1940 to March 1941 by 762.8 million RM and the aggregate investments in the 
aircraft industry, between September 1939 and January 1942 reached 5.18 billion 
RM. Turning to the tank industry, millions of RM were also invested. To illustrate, 
the Henschel & Sohn industry in Kassel alone increased its capacity by 100 000 
square meters, and other major facilities were constructed in Sankt Valentin in 
Austria, and in Plauen (Maschinenfabrik Niedersachsen). 19 Thus the increases of 
1942-1944 were associated with previous massive investments and with the more 
efficient use of resources. 
Other studies focus only on Luftwaffe strength. Three examples illustrate. 
Bekker (2001) points out that the total German aircraft production was 113 514 
airplanes (53 728 fighters, 18 235 bombers, 12 359 ground support, 6 299 
reconnaissance, 1 190 naval aviation, 3 079 transports, 3 145 gliders, 2 549 
telecommunications, 10 942 trainers, and 1 988 jet engine fighters).20 Pavelec (2010) 
provides the following figures for aircraft production: 1939: 8 300 (annual 
production); 1940: 10 800; 1941: 11 800; 1942: 15 600; 1943: 25 500; 1944: 39 800; 
1945: 7 500. Thus an aggregate production of 119 300 aeroplanes (18 449 bombers, 
53 339 fighters, 12 459 ground support, 3 118 transports, 6 293 reconnaissance, 1 
186 maritime patrol).21 A third source provides the aggregate estimate of 117 881 
aeroplanes.22 
2b. Studies in German  
Wagenführ (1954) was the first study to evaluate the German armaments 
production.23 This study does not provide data about the quantities of production but 
provides monthly indexes for the 1942-1945 period as well as annual indexes for the 
1941-1944 period. Wagenführ (1954) uses the same indexes produced by Albert 
Speer. The statistical basis is the production of the January-February 1942(=100). 
The annual indexes are presented in Table 2 below and demonstrate a constant 
increase of aggregate production from 97-98 index number in 1941, to 133-142 in 
1942, 216-222 in 1943, and 277 in 1944. The selection of January-February 1942 as 
the basis was criticized: using that month’s low aggregate production deliberately as 
the basis demonstrates high increases. The second wave of studies is that of Boelcke 
(1969, 1983).24 In Boelcke (1969) essential data are presented for the war economy 
of the 1942-1945 and for the war industry of the 1940-1945.25 The third study is that 
of Eichholtz (2003).26 These studies associate the German industrial production with 
the exploitation of the occupied territories and they point out that the German 
administrative system was rather inefficient due to complex and conflicting 










































































110 02 6 03 
1942 142 
(133) 
37 130 20 33 142 66 29 32 
1943 222 
(216) 
34 30 38 216 182 47 00 91 
1944 277 
(277) 
48 36 10 77 157 06 12 26 
Table 2: Annual Indexes of Industrial Production27 AP=Aggregate Production, 
numbers in brackets refer to Speer indexes and not to those of Wagenführ.  
2c. The study of the German Institute for Military History  
The question about the exact size of the German armaments production was 
fully addressed by the data provided by the German Institute for Military History in 
the monumental publication on the History of the Second World War.28 The German 
Institute for Military History provided accurate data across all types of weaponry 
procured throughout the war.  
During the period August-December 1939 the industry produced 53 983 
pistols, 414 586 rifles, 7 910 submachine guns, 16 893 machine guns, 1 533 anti-
tank guns, 2 300 anti-aircraft guns, 4 973 medium and heavy guns.  
For 1940 the production was as follows: 204 852 pistols, 1 293 719 rifles, 
125 879 submachine guns, 56 274 machine guns, 3 868 anti-tank guns, 7 720 anti-
aircraft guns, 14 530 medium and heavy guns.  
For 1941: 457 876 pistols, 1 271 263 rifles, 236 041 submachine guns, 79 
212 machine guns, 4 269 anti-tank guns, 10 646 anti-aircraft guns, and 14 688 
medium and heavy guns.29  
For 1942: 467 343 pistols, 1 149 593 rifles, 152 683 submachine guns, 81 
199 machine guns, 9 142 anti-tank guns, 16 555 anti-aircraft guns, 2 618 medium 
and heavy guns, and 3 864 rocket artillery.  
For 1943: 959 540 pistols, 1 946 200 rifles, 240 073 submachine guns, 165 
509 machine guns, 16 105 anti-tank guns, 25 740 anti-aircraft guns, 4 575 medium 
and heavy guns, and 1 706 rocket artillery systems.  
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For 1944: 1 038 340 pistols, 2 282 380 rifles, 500 074 submachine guns, 278 
164 machine guns, 14 209 anti-tank guns, 23 689 anti-aircraft guns, another 10 110 
medium and heavy guns, and 3 767 rocket artillery.  
For the first two months of 1945: 145 140 pistols, 310 118 rifles, 131 672 
submachine guns, 56 089 machine guns, 985 anti-tank guns, 1 771 anti-aircraft guns, 
1 351 medium and heavy guns, and 460 rocket artillery systems.30     
Thus the aggregate production levels for the whole 1939-1945 period were: 
3 327 074 pistols, 8 667 859 rifles, 1 943 332 sub-machine guns, 733 340 machine 
guns, 50 111 anti-tank guns, 78 786 anti-aircraft guns, 52 845 medium and heavy 
guns, and 9 797 rocket artillery systems. To these numbers we have to add more than 
326 683 bazookas, more than 16 325 light artillery guns, 342 super heavy guns, and 
more than 78 429 mortars.31 Ttank and armour vehicle production during August-
December 1939 was 790 tanks and vehicles. In 1940 total production was 2 808 
tanks and armour vehicles, in 1941 it was 6 008.32 In 1942 the production increased 
to 9 278 in 1943 to 19 824 and in 1944 to 27 340. Thus an aggregate production of 
66 048 tanks and armour vehicles took place during the war.33   
2d. Re-assessment of existing literature 
The above sources can confuse. Anyone can ask: “What was produced by 
Germany during the war years?” All the above sources provide different production 
data on all types of defence articles (aeroplanes, guns, tanks, etc). Different estimates 
occur because the literature was built over years with different information from 
national or industrial archives. In addition, exact specification of any war production 
is difficult due to: a) propaganda can falsify data in order to boost morale of the 
civilian population, b) production figures may include repairs of aeroplanes, 
aeroplane engines, guns, howitzers etc. Thus the figures are overstated, and c) 
captured material from the enemy can also be included in the statistics or it may 
actually reduce the war production effort, which is exactly what happened with the 
German case. The figures of the German Military Institute are the best ones 
available. 
3. The question of efficiency 
In order to cast light on the efficiency of the German arms production we use 
the best available cost figures in order to demonstrate that the procurement priorities 
were wrong. We also highlight that the looting of occupied Europe was an economic 
error, as the looting was associated with raw materials and civil goods and not with 
the maximization of the war effort.  
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3a. The available economic data and the mistaken procurement strategies 
In order to answer the question we need to use the best available data related 
to the production cost of various defence articles. The available data on cost do not 
cover all types of weapon systems. The data may also not reflect the final price due 
to inflation pressures, research and development costs, modification costs, etc. 
However, we use the best possible and available data. Table 3 has the cost of machine 
guns and small arms and Table 4 more advanced weapon systems. Turning to the 
cost of the artillery production we have the data of Table 5. The cost of some 
airplanes is demonstrated in Table 6. The cost of naval ships is demonstrated in 
Tables 7 and 8. 
Τype Price in RM/ unit 
MG 34 312-327 (400 RM for tripod) 





Table 3: Per Unit Cost of Small Arms and Machine Guns34
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Τype Per unit 
price cost 
in RM 
Cost in man-hours Cost in Raw Materials * Observations 
Tanks     
Panzer I 38 000 n/a n/a Μοdel PzKpfw I Ausf B without arms 
Panzer ΙΙA 52 640 n/a n/a Μοdel PzKpfw IΙ  
Panzer ΙΙB 49 000 n/a n/a  
Panzer ΙΙF 52 728 n/a n/a  
Panzer ΙΙΙ 96 163 
96 200 
103 163 
In 1943 reduced 
from 4 000 to 2 000 
n/a The third price refers to model PzKpfw ΙΙΙ 
Ausf without radio communications 




n/a 39.000 kg of steel, 238 kg 
of aluminum, 195 kg of 
copper, 116 kg of rubber, 
66 kg tin, 63,5 kg lead, 
0,23kg magnesium 
Raw materials for tank production of early 
models without gun and 
telecommunications equipment. The 
second item refers to model PzKpfw IV 
Ausf G with the ΚwK 40 L/43 gun.    
Panther 117 000 150 000 n/a No armament  
Tiger-I 300 000 300 000 n/a Fully armed. Without arms the cost was 
250 000 RM 
Tiger-II 321 500 n/a n/a  
StuG III 82 500 n/a n/a Μοdel StuG III Ausf G 
Sturmgeschutz III 82 500 n/a n/a  
Jadgpanther 21 000+   Price only of the value of the gun  
Sdkfz 9 Halftrack 60 000 n/a n/a  
Table 4: Per Unit Cost of Tanks and S/P Guns Procurement35(*)During 1942 the German side produced a special material called 
Zimmerit, which protected all types of vehicles from magnetic mines, which were used by the Soviets. From 1943 until 1945 one 
Tiger I tank needed 200 kg of the material, a Panther tank needed 160 kg, a Panzer IV 100 kg, and a StuG ΙΙΙ needed 70 kg. 
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Τype Per unit price 
cost in RM 
Observations 
s10cm K 18 37 500 Μedium gun 
s10cm K 42 50 000 Μedium gun 
10,5cm leFH 18 16 400 Anti-tank gun 
3,7cm Pak 35/36 5 730 Anti-tank gun 
7,5cm Pak 97/38 8 000 Anti-tank gun 
5 cm Pak 38 10 600 Anti-tank gun 
Pak 40 12 000 Anti-tank gun 
Pak 41 15 000 Anti-tank gun 
15 cm K 18 108 000 Heavy gun 
21 cm K 12 (E) 1 500 000 Heavy gun on rail 
80 cm K (Ε) 7 000 000 (*) Super heavy gun on rail 
15cm Nebelwerfer 41 3 350 Rocket system 
12,8cm Flakzwilling 40 202 000 Anti-aircraft gun 
Table 5: Per Unit Cost of Artillery Guns36 (*) Refers only to the gun and the 
wagon and not to the complete weapon-system.   
 Basic Price Price with engine 
Me-109E 58 800 85 970 
Ju-88 A 245 200 306 950 
He-111 H 203 900 265 650 
Ju-87 B 100 300 131 175 
Ju-52 125 000 163 000 
Table 6: Per Unit Cost of Aeroplanes (Rm/ Per Unit In 1941)37 The cost of one 
engine for the Μe 163 Komet fighter plane, was 400 000 RM.38   
From the data, the expensive types of armament such as the Tiger and 
Panther tanks were not only a military irrationality (since they were procured in small 
numbers) but an economic irrationality - since one Tiger tank had three times the 
cost of a Panzer IV. One of the last material assessments, March 15th 1945, gave the 
following operational levels: 62 per cent of the Panzer IV were operational, while 
59 per cent of the Tiger-ΙΙ tanks were operational.39 Thus the production of 489 
Tiger-ΙΙ tanks cost 157 213 500 RM an amount which could hypothetically have 
produced 1 355 Panzer IV tanks - triple the number, with a higher operational level, 
in the spring of 1945. Turning to the artillery arm we again observe that the 
production of the super heavy guns of 800mm (80cm) K (E), was another 
inefficiency. With a cost of 7 million RM the German artillery could have been 
supplied with immense numbers of Nebelwerfer rocket systems which had higher 
mobility and firepower. The Nebelwerfer systems had a devastating effect on the 
battlefield and in some cases they could even be launched from their boxes without 
even taking them out. Thus for each super heavy gun 2 089 Nebelwerfer systems 
could have been produced alternatively.  
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Ship Cost in RM 
Bismarck   197 000 000 
Tirpitz 181 000 000 
Scharnhorst  143 000 000 
Gneisenau   146 000 000 
Graff Zeppelin    92 700 000 
Rugzeugrater B   92 400 000 
Deutschland    80 000 000 
Admiral Sheer    90 000 000 
Admiral Graff Spee   82 000 000 
Admiral Hipper    85 000 000 
Blucher    87 800 000 
Printz Eugen  104 500 000 
Seydlitz    84 100 000 
Lutzow    83 600 000 
Grand Total  1 549 100 000 
Table 7: Construction costs-Major Surface Vessels40 
Turning to the Navy, we note that the construction of the 14 major ships (battleships 
and battle-cruisers) cost almost 1 550 million RM. This number of ships was not a 
major threat to the allied shipping and the 14 major German ships could not face 290 
ships of the Royal Navy. Alternatively this amount could have produced 83 light 
cruisers, destroyers and torpedo boats. Turning to the Air-force, we can note that the 
Me-109 fighters were cheaper to procure compared to the bombers or the transport 
planes. 
Type of ship Cost in RM 
Light Cruiser K class 38 000 000 
Light Cruiser Leipzig Class  40 000 000 
Destroyer 1934 Type 13 700 000 
Destroyer 1934A Type 14 100 000 
Destroyer 1936 Type 12 870 000 
Destroyer 1936A Type 13 180 000 
Torpedo boat 1935 Type   7 800 000 
Torpedo boat 1937 Type   9 300 000 
Average cost  18 618 750 
Table 8: Construction cost of Smaller Surface Vessels41 The per unit cost of 
submarine construction is not known, however just the Deschimag shipyards in 
Bremen during the war produced submarines with total value 1 084 305 731 RM.42 
Germany during the 1942-1945 period was under allied bombing and the 
rational armaments priority was for the fighter production. Although fighters were 
the airplanes most produced, their overall numbers (53 000 fighters) were inadequate 
to escort the Luftwaffe bombers to various offensives and also to support the ground 
forces of the German army. In addition the fighters had to defend the skies of 
Germany and occupied Europe against the allied bomber offensive. The massive 
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investments in the anti-aircraft artillery were also inefficient. To illustrate, every 
light anti-aircraft artillery, needed in average to use 4 940 shells in order to shoot 
down one allied bomber. The cost of this activity to the German economy was 37 
050 RM ($14 820). The cost for a heavy anti-aircraft gun was 267 440 RΜ ($106 
976).43 By comparison the Luftwaffe fighters needed only 4-5 bullets of 20mm or 1 
bullet of 30mm in order to shoot down 1 Β-17 US bomber, from the front side. The 
fighters needed alternatively 20 bullets of 20mm or 3 bullets of 30mm in order to 
shoot down one Β-17 US bomber from the tail. In 1943 the German fighters needed 
10 sorties in order to shoot down one Β-17.44  
Another defence project to consider is the “Atlantic Wall”, a series of 
fortifications from Norway to France, which aimed to repel an allied invasion of 
occupied Europe. Until May 1944 there were more than 8 482 fortified positions 
with more than 2 719 guns organised in 700 batteries.45 During the 1942-1944 
period, the value of the cement alone amounted to an astonishing 3.7 billion RM.46 
These fortifications did not stop the Normandy invasion. Considering the 
opportunity cost of the cement, if used for the finance of fighter production, could 
hypothetically have delivered 43 000 fighters. Without air superiority the allies 
would not been likely to invade then. Similarly, the V-1 and V-2 missile systems 
which were used extensively during the 1944-1945 period against London in an 
attempt to break the morale of the civilian population, cost $2 billion. This amount 
could have hypothetically produced 24 000 fighters.47  
The planning of the German armaments production was directly associated 
with Hitler’s knowledge, and, as Speer points out:  
Hitler’s technical horizon …was limited by the First World War. His 
technical interests were narrowly restricted to the traditional weapons of the 
army and the navy. In these areas he had continued to learn and steadily 
increase his knowledge…but he had little feeling for such new developments 
as for example, radar, the construction of an atom bomb, jet fighters and 
rockets…very often …Hitler would lecture his military advisers on the 
technical know-how he had just acquired [from them]. He loved to present 
such pieces of information with a casual air, as if the knowledge were his 
own…Hitler’s decisions led to a multiplicity of parallel projects. They also 
lead to more and more complicated problems of supply. One of his worst 
failings was that he simply did not understand the necessity for supplying 
the armies with sufficient spare parts … From 1944 …his programs became 




At this point one could argue that looking at the figures of German 
armaments production and cost prices requires comparison with the allied figures 
and prices. Comparing Germany to the USSR, Soviet production focused on a 
handful of armaments, produced more weapons, cheaper and faster. Thus between 
June 1941 to August 1945 (some months after German surrender of May 1945) the 
USSR produced: 12 139 000 rifles and carbines, 1 516 000 machine-guns, 482 000 
artillery guns of all calibers, 102 800 tanks and Self Propelled guns and 112 100 
airplanes. Moreover, production costs decreased during the war. Thus the cost of one 
airplane Il-4 in 1941 was 800 000 rubles, but in 1943-1945 it was 380 000. The cost 
of one airplane P-2 in 1941 was 420 000 but during 1943-1945 it was down to 265 
000. The cost of one T-34 tank in 1941 was 270 000 rubles but in 1943-1944 it was 
just 135 000. One heavy tank KV had a cost of 635 000 in 1941 but in 1943 it was 
down to 225 000. The price of one 7.62mm rifle was 163 rubles in 1941 but down 
to 100 rubles in 1943-1945.49 
British production, according to one source for the period September 1939 
to June 1944 period was: 2 457 000 rifles and carbines, 939 000 machine-guns, 390 
000 guns of all calibers, 29 300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1 156 main warships, 
and 94 600 airplanes. According to other sources the total cost of aircraft production 
during the war was £3 892.5 million. Throughout 1939-1943 British aircraft 
production surpassed German production both in terms of numbers and weight. In 
addition British bomber aircrew training was the most expensive in the world (£10 
000 per individual). The construction cost of major battleships during the war was 
between £7.5 and £10 million, equal to the cost of the army radar programme in 
1940.50 
American production, according to two sources was as follows: 6 552 290 
rifles, 2 679 819 machine guns, 411 874 artillery guns of all types and calibers, 231 
099 airplanes of all types, and 74 896 vessels of all types. The cost of one B-17 heavy 
bomber fully equipped was $292 000 whereas for the B-24 it was almost $237 000. 
The cost of one medium B-25 bomber was $153 396 and for a B-26 it was $239 
655.51   
This comparative perspective shows that German production could not 
match the allied production in terms of quantity. It is also observable, even from the 
limited economic data, that the allies achieved economies of scale and scope faster 
than the Germans. This seems to be true for the Soviets and the British but more 




3b. The irrational exploitation of occupied Europe and the failure of defence 
production maximization 
The second essential error of the German armaments planning strategy is the 
failure to integrate the industries of occupied Europe to the defence production of 
the Reich. Occupied Europe provided immense amounts of supply of raw materials, 
minerals, semi-finished goods and labour force, as Table 9 indicates. 
The data of Table 9 shows that the victories of the period 1939-1941 period 
provided Germany with immense economic potential. To this one has to add the 
colossal materials of the occupied USSR. Between June to December 1941 the 
German armies conquered a 978 000 square km territory of 62.4 million inhabitants, 
with 31 850 factories, 239 000 electrical machines, 175 000 machine tools, and 65 
000 km of railways.52 In spite of these tremendous reserves and raw materials the 
actual contribution of occupied Europe to the German armaments production was 
small. In 1943 the industries of occupied Europe supplied to the German armed 
forces the 4,8 percent of light arms, 6,4 percent of ammunition, 16,2 percent of 
vehicles, 35,7 percent of ship construction, 8,9 percent of aeroplanes production, 
28,6 percent of telecommunications equipment, and the 8,1 percent of optical 
equipment.53  
Turning to the aerospace industry we point out that the French industry 
during the period summer 1940-1944 produced only 4 142 aeroplanes. From those 
the 3 606 were delivered to Germany (87 percent) and with the addition of 11 219 
aeroplane engines.54 Furthermore throughout the period 1938-1945 the German 
armed forces looted from occupied countries more than 90 494 armour vehicles out 
of a grand total production of more than 111 866 items.55 It goes without saying that 
the actual contribution of the industries of occupied Europe to hardware equipment 
was extremely low.  
4. The German armaments production under the broader context of German 
strategic / operational planning  
The second essential dimension is the armaments production vis a vis the operational 
(tactical) and strategic requirements of the armed forces. Here the question is 
associated with the short and long term requirements of the armed forces during the 
war as the character of the war changed. Thus during the period September 1939 to 
December 1941 the German armed forces (Heer, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe) were 
anticipating short term blitzkrieg-style wars, mainly with the countries of continental 
Europe. The only exemption to this strategic doctrine was Britain where long term 
planning was made. This planning changed by December 1941, as Operation 
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Barbarossa failed and the USA entered the war. Germany faced a two front war with 
the Anglo-Saxon powers and with USSR. The problem after this development was 
dual. The first problem was that no-one could predict accurately the time-duration 
of the conflict. But the greater challenge was that this dual war imposed different 
priorities. The war against the USSR was mainly a land based conflict and thus the 
emphasis had to be given to the Heer (Army). The war against the Anglo-Saxon 
powers was mainly one of naval and air character thus priority had to be given to the 













554 000 801 000 1 922 000 3 277 000 
Population (m.) 76 78 129 283 
Electro-energy 
(kwh million) 
52 15 43 110 
Coal (m. tons) 185 2 161 348 
Iron ore (m. tons) 3.4 0.5 22.4 26.3 
Copper  
(thousand tons) 
31 1 67 99 
Bauxite 
(thousand tons) 
93 848 1 176 2 117 
Petroleum  
(m. tons) 
0.5 8.7 0.8 10 
Iron (m. tons) 16.3 1.4 20.2 37.9 
Steel (m. tons) 20 3.2 20.4 43.6 
Aluminum 
(thousand tons) 
131 23 64 218 
Grain  
(thousand tons) 
136 148 264 548 
Wool 
(thousand tons) 
19.6 59.7 59.4 138.7 
Cattle (million) 22.9 15.3 45.4 83.6 
Pigs (million) 26.7 9.9 27.8 64.4 
Vehicles 
(thousand) 
333 75 268 676 
Table 9: Resources of Germany and Occupied Europe56 (*) Italy, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria. (**) France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Denmark, 
Norway, Poland, Greece, Albania, Czechoslovakia. The table is incomplete since it 
does not include Finland and occupied USSR territories.  
4a. Assessment of the defence industry supply and the Army (Heer) 
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The Army (Heer) requirements were massive. To illustrate, the average daily 
expenditure of ammunition increased from 1 557 tons in 1942 to 2 453 tons in 1943 
and to the astonishing figure of 2 941 tons in 1944.57 In the Eastern front in 1941 the 
daily consumption of supplies by a panzer division was 30,4 tons when it was 
inactive; but in case of heavy combat the consumption of supplies increased to the 
staggering level of 711,2 tons. In the case of an infantry division the numbers were 
81,2 tons and 1 117,6 tons respectively. An infantry soldier when inactive was 
consuming 4,5 kg of supplies daily; but under heavy fighting the daily consumption 
increased to 22,6 kg.58 In the Eastern Front (20 June 1941), the Army group North 
was supplied with 68 000 tons of ammunition, Army Group Centre was supplied 
with 127 000 tons, and Army Group South with 84 000 tons. By June 25th 1941 the 
available quantities for the three Army Groups were as follows: 74 000 tons (North), 
135 000 (Centre) and 90 000 tons (South). By December 1941, the available 
quantities were reduced.59 During the summer attack of 1942 the situation was 
improved. During the seizure of Sevastopol, according to Giovanditto (1984) in the 
period May 7th  to June 7th 1942 the town was hit with 13 000 tons of bombs by Stuka 
bombers - in total the German artillery used 46 000 tons of shells with a rate of 324 
shells per second.60 In the battle of Kursk in July 5th 1943, during the early morning 
hours, around 10 000 German guns and mortars consumed more shells than the 
combined number of the German consumption during the campaigns against Poland 
and France put together. In December 1944, during the German attack in the 
Ardennes the Second Army had just 15 099 tons of ammunition, and had to provide 
to the 15th Army the 5 353 tons.61 During the period September 9th to December 15th 
the 7th Army received 1 502 personnel trains and almost 500 ammunition trains. An 
additional amount of 144 735 tons of supplies were also used. Throughout the 
Ardennes offensive the German side consumed 1 200 tons of ammunition per day.62  
Turning to the front in Africa, during 1941-1943 the German Africa Corps 
was constantly under supplied. To illustrate, in 1941 50 000 tons of supplies were 
needed per month but in July they only received 32 000 tons, in August 28 400 tons, 
and in November just 30 000 tons.63 According to Italian sources, the Axis forces in 
Africa during 1941 received 853 193 tons of supplies out of a total amount of 1 016 
442 tons (or 83,9 percent).64 The supply situation in Africa deteriorated in 1942. 
German and the Italian forces between February and May 1942 requested 100 000 
of supplies per month, but received only 60 000 tons. In July the supply was just 26 
000 tons. In his diary entry (8-9-1942) Rommel, the German supreme commander 
in Africa, noted: “in the past eight months we have received on average 120 000 tons 
of supplies per month which covered only the 40 percent of our needs”. In November 
the Axis forces received only 4 879 tons of oil and 2 331 tons of ammunition. In 
December the daily needs were for 400 tons of oil and 50 tons of ammunition but 
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the available amounts were just 152 tons and 16 tons respectively.65 In January 1943 
the Africa armies were supplied with 46 000 tons, 50 tanks, 214 artillery guns and 2 
000 vehicles. On February 10th 1943 the forces in Africa were having a deficit 
strength of 257 tanks, 177 reconnaissance vehicles, 565 anti-tank guns, 106 guns and 
mortars, 5 794 vehicles, 938 motorcycles, 2 386 machine guns.66 By May 1943 when 
the German and Italian armies in Africa surrendered to the allies they had available 
only 0,1percent to 0,4 percent of necessary fuels, 0,8 percent of infantry requested 
ammunition, 0,5 percent to 0,9 percent of requested anti-tank ammunition, and 
artillery shell supplies covered only the 1,2 percent of total needs.67 In the Italian 
front in 1944 the German forces did not have a supply problem. To illustrate, in 
March 1944 the German armies in Italy had a surplus of 16 891 tons of ammunition, 
increasing to 18 102 tons in May.68 In general the German land armies in all fronts, 
with the African front as the only exemption, were well supplied.  
4b. Assessment of the defence industry supply and the Navy (Kriegsmarine)  
The picture is different naval warfare. In the navy the main weapon against 
the allies was the submarine but both the supply of submarines and the logistical 
support was problematic. The construction of other types of vessels was very limited 
throughout the war period (Table 10). 
YEAR 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Total 
Pocket 
battleships 
3 - - - - - - 3 
Cruiser 
battleships  
2 - - - - - - 2 
Battleships - 1 1 - - - - 2 
Cruisers 8 1 - - - - - 9 
Destroyers 22 2 5 5 2 1 - 37 
Τοrpedo-boats 20 9 4 4 6 5 1 49 
Submarines 58 68 129 282 207 258 139 1 141 
Fast attack 20 26 34 44 46 52 11 233 
Minesweepers 44 14 25 31 38 29 8 189 
Table 10: Construction of Vessels 1939-194569 
In 1938 the construction of an aircraft carrier had started under the name 
Graf Zeppelin. By 1943 the 95 percent of the vessel was completed however the 
construction was abandoned in 1944 and the semi-finished ship was transported to 
Kiel and was dismantled by April 25th 1945. The absence of aircraft carriers had 
tremendous strategic and tactical limitations for the naval warfare. Furthermore, the 
decision to dismantle a 95 percent complete vessel demonstrates the irrationality of 
the procurement system.  
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The Naval priorities are demonstrated in Tables 10 and 11. Naval armaments 
shifted to submarines and neglected the surface ships. When the war erupted the 
Navy asked for 300 submarines as the required level of strength in order to destroy 
allied convoy systems. However, the number of operational vessels was never so 
high (Table 11). The maximum operational U-Boat strength of 240 vessels was 
achieved in May 1943, well below the 300 optimum target. It is worth pointing out 
that because of the limitations of the means of naval warfare, in June 7th 1943 Hitler 
requested the build-up of the largest naval program in German history. According to 
that 11 134 ships were expected to be constructed until 1948. From those, 2 400 were 
expected to be submarines. That was the fantasy of a lunatic.70  
Moreover the limitations of naval warfare were also associated with raw 
materials availability and logistical support. To illustrate, in the first quarter of 1940 
submarine construction was reduced as the navy had only 140,000 tons of iron at its 
disposal; whereas the minimum requirements were for 170 000 tons. Further, the 
available fuel quantities were inadequate as well. On March 16th 1940 navy fuel was 
just 870 800 tons; whereas in October 1st 1940 it was 807 500 tons. In November 
1941 the German Navy reported that total available fuel was 380 000 tons. To this 
another 30 000 tons could be added as the Italian navy reserve. The total Axis reserve 
of 410 000 tons was inadequate as the monthly requirements of the German Navy 
were 90 000 tons. There were also 106 000 diesel fuel tons available. However 
German surface vessels needed 40 000 tons of diesel during the two month period 
November-December 1941 and the submarines needed other 28 000 tons. Thus the 
Kriegsmarine was facing immobilization just at the time the US entered the war.  
The oil supply problem became worse. On April 1st 1942 total naval oil 
reserves were 150,000 tons. The total monthly allotment for both German and Italian 
navies was just 61 000 tons! The shortage of other raw materials was also critical. 
To illustrate, for the first quarter of 1943 the Navy was granted only 127 000 tons of 
steel. That was just the 5 percent of total steel production. However there was also a 
man-power problem since there was a major deficit of 200 000 men in June 1943 
and until September 1944 the man power problem became greater with a deficit of 




 Total U-boat 
strength 
U-Boats 
under repair  
Training U-
Boats 






Sep. 1939 57 6 12 39 1+1 2 
Νοv. 1939 52 6 13 33 2 1 
Jan 1940 55 6 14 35 2 2 
Μay 1940 49 3 15 31 3 1 
Jun 1940 51 4 20 27 3 - 
Nov 1940 68 11 33 24 6+3 2 
Dec 1940 73 13 33 27 9 - 
Mar 1941 99 29 43 27 11 5 
Jun 1941 138 52 48 38 14+1 4 
Aug 1941 168 59 45 64 19 3 
Sep 1941 186 65 48 73 24 3 (1) 
Dec 1941 236 99 49 88 22 10 
Feb 1942 257 99 57 101 16 2 
Apr 1942 283 107 57 119 17 3 
Jun 1942 309 124 59 126 21 3 
Sep 1942 356 122 62 172 18 11 (1) 
Νοv 1942 372 103 62 207 23+1 13 (1) 
Dec 1942 381 115 62 204 23 5 
Jan 1943 400 125 62 213 22 6 
Mar 1943 417 125 63 229 27 16 (2) 
Μay 1943 432 124 68 240 26 41 
Jun 1943 415 131 70 214 25 17 
Sep 1943 399 156 79 164 21 10 (2) 
Oct 1943 419 165 79 175 25+3 27 
Nov 1943 422 175 85 162 25 19 (9) 
Dec 1943 424 168 97 159 28 8 
Table 11: German submarine fleet 1939-1943 (selected months)72 (*) =war loot appear with + in monthly production. In the last 
column the numbers in brackets refer to accidents, or losses, in the Baltic.
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The German armaments industry failed to supply to the Navy the necessary 
weapon systems as well as the logistics required for an effective maritime war. The 
navy was constantly undersupplied in surface ships and even the submarine arm was 
denied the required numbers of vessels. The additional limitations of raw materials, 
fuel, man power, made the situation worse. Under the circumstances the German 
defeat in the battle of the Atlantic was the expected outcome for an under-supplied 
navy. With the command of the oceans the Anglo-Saxon naval powers were allowed 
to transport to Europe millions of men and material first for the liberation of North 
Africa and later for the liberation of Europe (Italy-France).  
4c. Assessment of the defence industry supply and the Air-Force (Luftwaffe)  
As already demonstrated the overall air armaments production during the 
war was estimated between 113 000-125 000 airplanes. The production of the most 
used types is demonstrated in Table 12.  
Most sources point out that total production covered the overall losses. To 
illustrate, according to Ellis (1995) the overall losses were 116 584 airplanes. Sitaras 
(2006) provides the estimate of 100 000 airplanes; whereas Overy (2005) estimates 
the losses of fighters, bombers and night fighters to 70 611 airplanes.73 Although 
total production surpassed the losses when this is compared and contrasted with the 
allied aircraft production (UK, USA, USSR) the numbers are overwhelmingly 
against the German effort. To illustrate, Ranki (1993) provides the estimate of 87 
221 British airplanes, 231 099 US airplanes and 84 800 Soviet planes during 1942-
1944, providing a total allied production of 403 120 airplanes. 74 Ellis (1995) 
provides the figure of 121 754 airplanes only for the UK. The estimate for the US is 
324 750 airplanes and for the USSR it is 157 261 airplanes, thus providing an 
amazing total of 603 765 airplanes. 75 The figures provided by Overy (1995, 2005) 
are: 105 286 British planes, 324 840 US planes and 158 218 Soviet planes; thus an 
overall figure of 588 344 airplanes. 76 Harrison (1998) provides the following 
figures: 94 600 British planes, 192 000 US fighter planes and 112 100 Soviet planes; 
thus providing an allied total of 398 700 planes77 
In spite of the variations it is clear that the combined allied airplane 
production at least triple that of Germany, but it was not just the numbers but also 
the quality since the allies produced super heavy bombers which the German 
Luftwaffe could not dream of a similar design. Allied fighters were in many cases 
equal if not better to those of the Luftwaffe. Thus, in spite of the efforts the German 





Τype  Quantity produced Role 
Ar 196 435 Hydroplane 
Ar 234 214 Bomber 
BV 138 276 Hydroplane 
BV 222 4 Hydroplane 
Do 17 506 Bomber 
Do 217 1 730 Bomber 
Do 215 101 Bomber 
Do 18 71 Hydroplane 
Do 24 135 Hydroplane 
Do 335 11 Fighter 
Fi 156 2 549 Telecommunications  
FW 190 20 001 (7 647) Fighter 
FW 200 263 Long range reconnaissance  
FW 189 846 Reconnaissance  
Go 244 43 Transport  
He 111 5 656 (5 678) Bomber / Transport  
He 115 128 Hydroplane 
He 177 1 446 Βοmber 
He 219 268 Νight fighter  
Hs 126 510 Reconnaissance  
Hs 129 841 Ground support   
Ju 52 2 804  Transport  
Ju 87 4 881 (4 890) Dive bomber  
Ju 88 15 000 (16 911) Βοmber, reconnaissance, Νight fighter 
Ju 188 1 036 Βοmber 
Ju 290 41 Long range reconnaissance  
Ju 352 31 Transport  
Ju 388 103 Βοmber 
Me 109 30.480 (31.887) Fighter 
Me 110 5 762 (6 257) (6 050-6 170) Night Fighter 
Me 262 1 294 (1 433) Fighter & Fighter-bomber 
Me 323 201 Transport  
Me 410 1 013 (1.160) Βοmber 
Ta 154 8 Fighter 
Ta 152 67 Fighter 
Total  98 755  
Table 12: Production of Main Types of Airplanes 1939-194578 
5. Concluding remarks: An opportunity cost analysis 
The conventional analysis of the German armaments production is 
associated with the so-called Speer-miracle; the tripling of armaments production 
from 1942 to 1944 under the bombardment of allied air-forces. Although this static 
analysis is correct from the analysis of the above data the following conclusions can 
be deducted:  
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5.1. The German defence industry had to supply the armed forces during the 
period September 1939-December 1941 for short war type campaigns under the 
blitzkrieg operational / tactical doctrine. During this period the priority of armaments 
production was given to the Air-Force (Luftwaffe) and the Heer (Army). However 
after December 1941, when the German assault in front of Moscow was checked and 
the US entered the war the German industry had to plan for a long war with both the 
USSR and the Anglo-Saxon powers (UK and USA). However it was not just the time 
duration of the war but the fact that the war against the USSR was mainly a land 
warfare struggle; whereas the war against the USA and Britain was a naval and air-
warfare struggle. To this strategic challenge the German industry failed completely. 
The German side did rather well in the land warfare struggle against the USSR by 
producing adequate quantities of material and weapons; however it did very poorly 
in the naval and aerial warfare against the Anglo-Saxons. Thus at the strategic level 
the so-called Speer miracle was not a miracle at all. Under the Speer administration 
the Germans did quite well against one opponent but not against the other.  
5.2. The strategic failure is not just the only aspect which has to be 
reconsidered. At the tactical and economic level important errors have been made. 
Thus during WWII the Germans (and Hitler himself) tried to do everything. The 
attempt was to produce tanks, guns, all types of airplanes, submarines, missile 
systems, built fortresses (Atlantic Wall), produce small arms etc. To make things 
more complex the idea was to procure many different types and models of weaponry 
thus instead of standardization the German side produced multi type weapon 
systems. This policy had immense harmful ramifications, and these are briefly 
illustrated below:  
5.3. Starting with the Army (Heer) the German industry had to maximize the 
production of low cost and high efficiency tanks like the Panzer III, Panzer IV και 
Panther types. Thus the development and production of the expensive Tiger I, Tiger 
II, and Maus systems was a classic case of waste of resources (both financial and 
raw materials). 79 In the artillery similar examples can be given. Again production 
should have been focused on the Nebelwerfer systems the 88mm the 75mm and the 
120 mm guns. The super heavy guns and the railway guns were a waste of resources. 
The logistical support of numerous artillery and tank systems was difficult. To 
illustrate according to a memorandum of January 1st 1945- 
-the Rheinmetall-Borsig company had under development 31 different types 
of ammunition and gun tubes;  
-the Fasterstoff und Spinnerei company had five new models under 
development; 
-the Wittkowitzer Bergbau company, had six models under development; 
136 
 
-the Skoda company had 24 models;  
-the Brunner Waffenwerke had six models; 
-the Bradenburger Eisenwerke had 13 models;  
-the Hugo Steiner had five models;  
-the Hessische Industriewerke had five models;  
-the Krupp Industry had 24 models;  
-the Dynamit AG had nine models;  
-the Jungker had 2 models;  
-the Schrammberg had 18;  
-the Deutsche Sprengchemie had four models;  
-the Deutsche Waffen und Munitionfabrik had 31 models;  
-the Th. Bergmann had 11;  
-the Zeiss had four models;, 
-the Siemens & Halske had two;  
-the Güstloffwerke had four;  
-the ΑΕG had six;  
-the Deutsche Edelstahlwerke had four;  
-the Sachenwerke had two;  
-the Stock & Co (Stolberg) had two;  
-the SGW Döhlen had three; and  
-the Niedersachen AG had 29 different models.80  
 
The various types of vehicles used 29 types of telescopes, 26 types of 
periscopes, 4 types of observation periscopes, two additional types for the driver. 
There were 20 different telecommunication systems and 40 different types of 
machines for the armored vehicles.81 
5.4. In the Navy (Kriegsmarine) the policy of priority to submarine 
construction versus that of surface vessels was correct, since submarines were 
cheaper and needed less time, however at the tactical level the construction of 660 
VII-type submarines was a waste of resources since they were technologically 
inferior and had only 14 torpedoes when the submarines of ΙΧ-type (version C) had 
22 torpedoes, they were faster and had a bigger range. Thus production should have 
been focused in the second type rather than the first.   
5.5. In the case of the Air-Force (Luftwaffe) the production of Me-109 
fighters against the FW-190 was an error. Already from the Battle of Britain it was 
clear that the Me-109 was marginalized by the British Spitfire. When the US Ρ-47 
and Ρ-38 appeared the Me-109 had no chance of success. The fighter policy of the 
Luftwaffe was catastrophic. The German side had to focus in 3 types of fighters only. 
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Τhese were the FW-190 for day missions, the Me-110 for night missions, and the 
Me-262, turbine jet fighter which had to be operational at least 18 months earlier. 
Thus the production of 12 807 Me-109 fighters in 1944 was a classic example of 
failure at tactical and strategic level.82 In the bombers case, the He-111 although 
reliable was inefficient, since it was a medium range design. The production of the 
Ju-87 Stuka, was a gross error. Another error was the case of the Me-210 fighter. 
Τhis particular design was originally made in 1938, but mass production started in 
April 1941. Τhe plane had technical problems and by April 14th 1942 the program 
was terminated, after the overall development of 158 airplanes (with other 26 in the 
production line). The overall, Me-210 project cost, to the Luftwaffe in terms of 
capital, raw materials and productivity, was equal to the amount of 600-1 000 
planes.83         
5.6. The decision to establish an immense Anti-aircraft (A/A) arm was 
strategically correct but the implementation of the decision was a tactical error. The 
most important argument in favor of the A/A umbrella was that the cost is smaller 
compared to the increase of the air-fleet. To illustrate, the increase of fighter strength 
is associated with the following additional costs: 
-Training of pilots in the new fighters,  
-The re-training of pilots and the land based personnel for the technical 
support of the airplanes (more advanced models may have different technical 
specifications),  
-Additional requirements and expenditure in fuel,  
-Construction and expansion of new or existing aerodromes which require 
additional A/A protection,  
-Expansion of Search and Rescue capabilities,  
-Built of new telecommunication facilities, radar systems, ammunition and 
spare parts for planes, lubricants etc.  
-In addition the time production of Α/Α guns and the time of operational 
entry is smaller compared to that of airplane design, mass production, entry 
to service, logistical support etc.  
 
The Α/Α umbrella was not wrong; however the mass production of Α/Α guns 
should have been focused, to the best type that of 128mm gun with a range of 35 000 
feet and an average consumption of 3 000 shells per 1 shoot down. Contrary to this 
the well-known 88mm gun (Μοdel 36-37) needed 15,000 shells / 1 shoot. By the end 
of 1944 only 5 percent of Α/Α guns was of 128mm calibre and the majority of A/A 
guns was of 88mm calibre.84 The correct decision to establish an A/A umbrella was 
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undermined by focusing the production to the 88mm A/A gun which had smaller 
caliber and consumed more shells. 
5.7. The development of strategic missiles (V-1 and V-2) was also an error. 
Τhe V-1 systems had an average production cost of just 5 000 RM or £150.85 The 
production of one V-1 demanded 900 working-hours.86Τhe tοtal R&D cost for the 
development of the V-2 system was at the staggering level of 2 billion RM, amount 
equal to the 25 percent of the cost of the US Manhattan Project (for the construction 
of the atom bomb). In addition to this the cost for the production of 12 000 V-2 
systems was 750 m. RM.87 According to a different source, the production cost of 
one V-2 was £6,000, excluding the initial R&D cost.88 These sums could have been 
invested for the procurement of conventional weapons with more destructive power. 
The real contribution of V-1 and V-2 systems to the war effort was marginal; thus in 
terms of cost benefit analysis their production was catastrophic. 
5.8. The construction of the Atlantic Wall was also an error. Static defence 
fortresses could easily be destroyed, bypassed or captured. This was the lesson 
actually from the successful German operations of 1940 against the French Maginot 
line and the Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael. However the Germans failed to 
understand these lessons and by investing in the Atlantic Wall immense sums and 
raw materials deprived other more essential armament priorities.       
5.9. During the war years the German labour force in the economy was 
reduced considerably from 39 114 000 workers in 1939 to 29 800 000 in 1944 and 
the size of forced labour (prisoners of war, Jews and other nationalities from 
occupied Europe) increased from 301 000 workers to 7 126 000 in the same period.89 
Thus total labour force in the economy decreased from 39 415 000 workers in 1939 
to 36 926 000 in 1944. The mass murder in concentration camps of more than 6 000 
000 Jews was not only an immense humanitarian atrocity it was the biggest error in 
German war effort since these people could have been used as additional labour 
force.  
5.10. The German planners failed to realize that all efforts after 1942 were 
doomed to fail, since Germany could not balance the joint armaments production of 
the Big-Three (Britain, US, USSR). When in March 1944 the German Armaments 
Minister Dr. Speer announced the so called “Victory Program” which aimed to 
increase arms production by 98 percent, tank production by 73 percent, vehicle 
production by 26 percent, airplane engine and frames production by 74 percent and 
ammunition production by 20 percent, was a futile plan. Even after the Normandy 
landings the German Minister was stating that the war would last for five more 
years.90 The strategic error of the German side is obvious. Hitler and his planners 
failed to realize that the German armaments effort was futile especially since in many 
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sub-categories was below the production volumes of the Hindenburg Program of 
1917-1918. Furthermore even with the addition of Japanese and other Axis allies 
strength the Allies enjoyed overwhelming superiority. If the German armaments 
production was maximized in 1942, rather than 1944, a window of opportunity was 
open for a German victory in the East. When this did not achieve for tactical and 
strategic reasons the probability of victory became more and more marginalized. It 
goes without saying that the “Speer miracle” has been a strategic and operational 
failure.  
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